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Abstract 
When firms choose to acquire others, those acquisitions can either be considered 
diversifying or non-diversifying.  Whether the firm diversifies or not has been shown to 
affect the post-acquisition performance of that firm.  Past merger and acquisition (M&A) 
research has identified a “diversification discount” when firms diversify through M&A 
activity.  However managers continue to diversify, posing the question, “Why do firms 
continue to diversify in the face of research indicating negative post-acquisition 
performance”?  The answer may be found in that much of the past research has treated all 
acquisitions the same by analyzing a wide cross-section of acquisitions from industries of 
all types.  This assumption may be wrong, as not all acquisitions are the same.   
 The present research attempts to build on past research by analyzing only a single 
segment of M&A activity—the high-technology industry between the years 1994 and 
1998.  In addition, this study differs from past research by analyzing firm post-acquisition 
performance over a longer three-year period.  The present research did achieve 
significant results that may help eliminate some of the clouds over diversification’s true 
impact on M&A activity.  A “diversification discount” was identified by the present 
research, confirming the findings of much of the past M&A literature.  
 1 
EXPLORING THE DIVERSIFICATION DISCOUNT: A FOCUS ON HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY TARGET FIRMS 
I.  Introduction 
 
The trend over time is that surviving firms acquire other firms, thereby resulting 
in more diversified firms.  For example, the proportion of the largest 500 U.S. industrial 
firms that were substantially diversified more than doubled between 1949 and 1974 from 
30 to 63 percent (Rumelt, 1982).  In recent times, this merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activity has continued to increase and set new records every year between 1994 and 2000 
(Wall Street Journal, 2001).  At the end of the 1990s market boom, more than $1.7 
trillion worth of merger and acquisition activity occurred in the U.S. (Wall Street Journal, 
2002).  More is at stake as well, as the value of the merger transactions have increased 
(Wall Street Journal, 1997).  If these larger merger transactions perform negatively, the 
stock market and individual investors may be impacted in an even more detrimental 
fashion. 
By completing an acquisition, acquiring firms either diversify into new areas or 
remain focused in existing areas of business.  Firms can remain focused in the same 
business by completing horizontal acquisitions.  Non-diversifying horizontal acquisitions 
involve target firms in the same industry as the bidder, with similar products and 
competencies (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 1998).  A horizontal acquisition may take 
advantage of economies of scale to lower management and overhead costs by reducing 
the resources needed to run the merged company.  On the other hand, diversifying 
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acquisitions result from both vertical and conglomerate mergers.  These occur when the 
target and bidder operate in different stages or steps of the production process (e.g., such 
as a paper producer acquiring a logging company) or when the target and bidder have no 
relation to each other (e.g., such as General Electric’s purchase of NBC) respectively 
(Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 1998).  These acquisitions can create economies of scope 
or reduce risk by diversifying into businesses with different economic cycles.  This study 
will not distinguish between the two types of diversifying acquisitions, vertical and 
conglomerate; instead, only the distinction between non-diversifying and diversifying 
acquisitions will be considered.   
Research has identified several rationales for diversification including, but not 
limited to: 
1. Increased market power that can facilitate predatory pricing and reciprocal 
buying and selling with customers and suppliers (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 
2000) 
2. Firms with significant free cash flows can invest them by acquiring businesses 
to derive greater returns and to discourage future takeover attempts (Hitt et al, 
1998) 
3. To create more flexibility in capital formation—a diversified firm can access 
external funding for expansion, or shift capital within its portfolio to do so 
(Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000) 
4. Reduction in the diversified firm’s overall risk by combining businesses that 
have financial flows different from each other (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 
2000) 
5. By acquiring firms with similar core competencies or related resources a 
diversified firm can take advantage of economies of scope (Hitt et al, 1998; 
Rumelt 1982) 
Managers typically justify diversifying acquisitions with these reasons in mind and the 
ultimate goal of increasing shareholder value.  However, a majority of past research has 
identified a “diversification discount” in firm value that may occur after a firm 
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diversifies.  Either the costs of diversification equal or outweigh the benefits of 
diversification, or methodological problems have kept researchers from observing the 
realization of diversification benefits.   
Motivation 
 Much research has been conducted on firm post-acquisition performance.  Most 
conclude that diversification from M&A activity does not improve a firm’s performance; 
instead it creates a “diversification discount” (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; 
Berger & Ofek, 1995; Anand & Singh 1997; Mason & Goudzwaard 1976; Lang & Stulz 
1994; Campa & Kedia, 2002).  Despite the large amount of findings that present a 
negative correlation between diversification and performance, many firms continue to 
diversify.  A small amount of research suggests that some firms benefit from 
diversification but that, on average, most do not (Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Campa & 
Kedia, 2002).   
 A paradox seems to exist.  Why do diversifying acquisitions persist in the face of 
evidence that they do not improve firm performance?  The answer may be found in the 
fact that prior research typically treats all acquisitions the same.  However, not all 
acquisitions are the same (Bower, 2001) and past research that analyzes a wide cross-
section of acquisitions might not be suitable.  Therefore, this study distinguishes itself by 
isolating the research sample to high-technology industries.  Campa and Kedia (2002) 
argue that diversifying firms are often responding to a technology change, which may 
explain the lower performance of diversifying firms.  Limiting the sample of this study to 
firms in high-technology industries better controls for the negative impact of technology 
uncertainty on firm performance and provides a more controlled sample for measuring 
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the impacts of diversification on performance.  In addition, most existing research 
focuses on short-term measures of firm performance, which may not adequately predict 
long-term performance under conditions of uncertainty (e.g., Chatterjee, Lubatkin & 
Schulze, 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1992; Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986) such as that found 
in high-technology industries.  Another contribution is the present study examines the 
diversifying firms’ abnormal stock return over a longer, three-year period.  A final 
contribution is that this research compares the performance of diversifying firms with 
firms completing non-diversifying acquisitions within the same industry; thereby 
controlling for any performance consequences of merely completing an acquisition.   
Scope 
This study examines a sample of public firms that acquired a high-technology target 
firm between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1998 with a market capitalization of 
$10M or greater.  Post acquisition performance is measured using Jensen’s alpha-- a 
measure of abnormal return (Jensen, 1968).  In order to develop an empirical model that 
can isolate diversifying and non-diversifying firm performance and to eliminate biases, 
the following control variables are used: 
1. Value of the transaction 
2. Firm profitability prior to acquisition 
3. Form of acquisition  
4. Method of accounting for the merger  
5. Industry environment 
6. Year of acquisition 
7. Acquisition experience  
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Research Objectives 
This research has two objectives: 
1.  Define, document and utilize past research relevant to post-acquisition firm 
performance, to identify diversification’s effect and other factors significant in 
examining firm post-acquisition performance.   
2.  Determine if diversifying firms perform differently from non-diversifying firms 
after an acquisition.  
Layout 
 This thesis contains five chapters.  Chapter one introduces and motivates the 
research.  Chapter two consists of a literature review examining relevant published 
research with an effort to summarize it.  Chapter three describes the methodology of the 
data analysis, explaining the sample, the variables, and the regression performed.  
Chapter four will discuss the results and discussion of the research.  Chapter five includes 
a summary of the present research, future research suggestions, and possible implications 
for the Department of Defense (DoD).   
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II.  Literature Review 
This chapter begins with a summary of past literature findings of merger and 
acquisition (M&A) rationale, high-technology firms, and conclusions of M&A impact.  
Next, past research will be used to justify the performance measure for this research.  
Explanation of the independent variable and the control variables follows and will also 
utilize past research.  
Literature Review of Past Research 
An extensive list of past merger and acquisition (M&A) research exists.  Each 
study has contributed to what is known about M&A activity.  This review identified over 
forty studies in order to explore those relevant to diversification and its impact on firm 
performance.  The articles obtained were from a variety of management journals, such as: 
Strategic Management Journal, The Journal of Finance, Academy of Management 
Journal. 
M&A Rationale  
Most managers’ main purpose in acquiring other firms is to create more wealth 
for their shareholders (Carper, 1990).  Acquiring firms’ managers present many diverse 
reasons justifying their decision to acquirer targets with increasing shareholder wealth as 
the end goal.     
By far, the most frequently cited motivation for acquisitions is to create synergy 
and capitalize on economies of scale and/or scope with the acquired firm (e.g., Palich, 
Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Rumelt, 1982; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; 
Lubatkin et. al., 2001; Hayward, 2002; Anand & Singh, 1997; Beattie, 1980; Hitt et. al., 
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1998; Berkovitch & Khanna, 1991).  Managers argue that the synergy created by the 
acquisition allows the commonalities or complementarities between the two firms to 
create a combined value greater than the value of the two independent firms (Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997).  Synergy can result as the two firms share knowledge and skills at 
many different levels such as, development, production, management, and marketing.  
Specifically, economies of scope might manifest as shared manufacturing facilities, while 
economies of scale might manifest as joint production of components (Farjoun, 1998).  
Synergistic goals are most often associated with horizontal mergers, as they are most 
often associated with similarities between firms.  Similarities between firms allow the 
synergies to develop, while reducing costs as the combined firm’s operations are 
streamlined.  Together, these synergies equate to greater operating efficiency and result in 
increased firm performance (Berger & Ofek, 1995).   
 Increased market power is another motivation for M&A activity (Palich, Cardinal, 
& Miller, 2000; Lubatkin et. al., 2001; Hayward, 2002; Anand & Singh, 1997; Beattie, 
1980; Hitt et. al., 1998).  After M&A activity, the acquirer has a greater market share and 
improved ability to set prices (Hitt et. al., 1998; Lubatkin et. al., 2001).  With a larger 
market share, the new firm can use predatory pricing to drive competitors out of the 
market (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000).  In addition, the acquired firm has one less 
competitor, directly increasing market power (Lubatkin et. al., 2001, Hayward, 2002).  
Again, the market power motivation is most often used in horizontal type mergers, as 
market power is associated with a single industry or product.    
 Better resource allocation, or more flexible capital formation, is another M&A 
rationale (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 
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1995; Hitt et. al., 1998).  Managers argue that M&A activity in larger firms, with greater 
internal capital resources, allows better allocation of those resources.  Accessing internal 
rather than external capital allows managers to shift resources more efficiently to other 
business segments, thereby enhancing firm performance (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 
2000; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995).  A manager with a diversified 
firm, or one seeking a more diversified firm, would use this rationale as uncorrelated 
segments allow for the resource shifting (segments of a horizontal firm would most likely 
need capital at similar times in the business cycle). 
 Managers seeking a more diversified firm also use risk reduction as a motivation 
(Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Beattie, 1980; Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987).  Managers 
use the same justification stockholders use to diversify their portfolios.  By combining 
businesses or segments with less than perfectly correlated performance demands, firms 
can insulate their profits from adverse shifts in the demand for their products, thereby 
reducing systematic risk (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Beattie, 1980; Lubatkin & 
O’Neill, 1987).  Risk reduction then facilitates better performance.  By definition, this 
risk reduction can only occur in diversified firms. 
 Directly pertinent to the present research, firms also pursue M&A activity as a 
substitute for research and development (R&D) (Bower, 2001; Hayward, 2002; 
Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999).  R&D is vital to high-tech companies as their products often 
become obsolete in a matter of months (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999).  Companies that 
need technical knowledge can either purchase it or develop it in-house (Chaudhuri & 
Tabrizi, 1999).  Shorter product life cycles necessitate shorter development periods 
(Bower, 2001).  Acquisition can be used in place of in-house R&D to develop a product 
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quickly (Bower, 2001).  Chaudhuri and Tabrizi (1999:125) noted that several companies 
have been able to “cut their time to market in half through a successful acquisition.”  
M&A allows high-tech firms to quickly obtain the R&D that is vital to their industry.   
 Managers justify M&A use with the ultimate goal of increased firm performance.  
Synergistic efficiencies are most often mentioned as motivation; however, many more 
exist.  In addition, substituting M&A for in-house R&D is specific to high-technology 
firms and is most relevant to the present research.   
Diversification’s Impact 
 The majority of existing research suggests that diversification is a poor 
management strategy for the acquirer.  Many approaches have been taken to discover 
diversification’s impact on firm post-acquisition performance.  Literature has compared 
diversified firms operating in several industries to portfolios of independent firms and 
found that the diversified firms consistently were valued less than a diversified portfolio 
(Mason & Goudzwaard, 1976).  Berger and Ofek (1995) compared the value of entire 
diversified firms to the sum of their respective segments and concluded that diversified 
firms have 13-15 percent less value.  Anand and Singh’s (1997) approach focused on a 
declining industry and again found that consolidation, the opposite of diversification, was 
a better strategy.  In addition, Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) quantified the 
acquirer’s post-acquisition performance loss over five years at close to 10 percent.  
Research that focused on the degree of diversification and firm performance concluded 
that “related” diversification could have a positive impact; however, non-related 
diversification consistently displays a negative impact (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Rumelt, 
1982; Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000).  This is only a short list of research identifying a 
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“diversification discount” that accompanies firm performance after a diversification 
strategy is pursued.   
 A smaller body of research has identified a positive impact of diversification on 
post-acquisition performance.  Lubatkin (1987) employed two new measures of firm 
performance and found that acquisitions lead to permanent gains in stockholder value.  
After extensively controlling for the firms’ characteristics, or endogenity (i.e., size, 
profitability, environment, etc.), Campa and Kedia (2002:1760) concluded 
“diversification is a value enhancing strategy for those firms that actually pursue it…”  
Research focusing on the degree of diversification has concluded that if the target is 
related to the acquirer, “related” diversification can have a positive impact on firm 
performance (e.g., Lang & Stulz, 1994; Rumelt, 1982; Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000).  
It is important to add that research has also identified that target shareholders typically 
benefit from firms that diversify though acquisition (Lubatkin, 1987; Loughran & Vijh, 
1997).     
 The contrasting findings of past M&A research are evidence that the impact of 
diversification remains clouded.  Most of the research that assumes a black and white 
approach between diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions finds that diversification 
has a negative impact on post acquisition performance of the acquirer creating a 
“diversification discount.”  However, others find positive post-acquisition performance, 
especially when the degree of diversification is accounted for in the analysis.  In addition, 
much of existing research has a potential limitation as it uses cross-sectional samples and  
assumes all acquisitions are the same.  The inconclusive body of past research leaves 
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room for the present research to add to the understanding of diversification’s impact on 
firm performance using a sample that controls for the “type” of acquisition.    
High-Technology Focus 
 The conflicting conclusions of past M&A research leave room for better 
understanding.  M&A activity has been shown to have both positive and negative impact 
on an acquirer.  The conflicting conclusions may be a result of the cross-sectional 
perspective of past research, because not all acquisitions are alike (Bower, 2001).  
Therefore, the present research attempts to control for this fact by focusing on one 
business sector, high-technology.    
 A minimal amount of past research has focused on single industries.  Farjoun 
(1998) focused solely on the manufacturing industry in an extensive effort to determine 
relatedness’ impact on diversification.  Fowler and Schmidt (1989) also focused on the 
manufacturing industry and examined the impact of six factors on the post-acquisition 
performance of 42 tender offers.  In an effort to study an industry in decline, Anand and 
Singh (1997) limited their research to the U.S. defense industry.  Ramaswamy (1997) 
focused on the U.S. banking industry in order to determine when horizontal mergers 
succeed.  However, Lubatkin et al. (2001:344) is the only research found that explicitly 
remarks that limiting research to only one industry controls for one source of variance of 
cross-sectional studies, “noncomparable industries.”   
 High-technology industries are different from others; Chaudhuri and Tabrizi 
(1999:124) claim high-technology industries are “fundamentally different.”  High-
technology firms rely on products that have very short life times.  A microprocessor may 
become obsolete in a few months as opposed to a manufacturing industry product such as 
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a car that is viable for possibly a decade.  Long-term success in a high-technology 
industry is contingent on a firm’s ability to maintain superior technical know-how and 
innovation.  This technical expertise resides in the firm’s employees, which again 
distinguishes high-technology corporations.  Unlike firms in other industries, high-
technology firms suffer when they lose key technical employees (Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 
1999).  High-technology industries must be the sole focus of research that involves them, 
as these key differences make high-technology industries fundamentally different from 
others.     
 Precedents exist for M&A research to focus on a specific type of industry.  In 
addition, high-technology industries have intrinsic properties that others do not.  
Comparing firms in a cross-sectional analysis creates additional variance that may lead to 
inconclusive results.  Therefore, this study focuses only on high-technology M&A 
activity.   
Performance Measure 
 A performance measure must be chosen to illustrate the acquisition’s effect on 
firm performance.  Several measures have been utilized in past research.  One measure, 
return on assets (ROA), has been used (e.g., Park, 2002; Ramaswamy, 1997; Mason & 
Goudzwaard, 1976, Hitt et. al., 1998) as it is a simple and straightforward calculation 
(profit divided by assets) that allows a comparison to be made between the firm’s pre and 
post-acquisition performance.  However, ROA has a fault in that it is impacted by the 
method of accounting for the acquisition (i.e., pooling or purchase).  Using purchase 
accounting, ROA will decrease if a premium was paid for the target because the 
combined post-acquisition assets will be larger due to increased goodwill and/or assets, 
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the denominator in ROA (King, 2003).  Past research has also used a measure called 
“Tobin’s q” (e.g., Anand & Singh, 1997; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995; 
Servaes, 1991).  Lang & Stulz (1994:1249) express Tobin’s q as, “the present value of 
future cash flows divided by the replacement cost of tangible assets.”  Some of its 
advantages include: it incorporates the capitalized value of the benefits of diversification, 
and it is not influenced by time periods as it focuses on only a point in time (Lang & 
Stulz, 1994).  However, Tobin’s q is based upon what the market thinks the benefits from 
diversification will be, whether or not they are real (Lang & Stulz, 1994).  This 
assumption that the market efficiently reacts, in an unbiased way, instantly at a point in 
time to an acquisition, has motivated researchers to seek other performance measures.  
Both ROA and Tobin’s q leave room for a better performance measure.   
In order to measure the performance of mutual funds relative to the rest of the 
market, Jensen (1968) created a unit of measure known as “Jensen’s alpha.”  The 
measure was the intercept of the line created by regressing an investment’s performance 
with the performance of the market using a benchmark over time.  Other studies have 
since used the measure, or a form of it, to determine the post-acquisition performance of 
an acquirer relative to a general benchmark of the market (i.e., S&P 500, DJIA) (e.g., 
Beattie, 1980; Hoskisson et al, 1993; Farjoun, 1998; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 
1994, Lubatkin, 1987).  Jensen’s alpha is a straightforward calculation that can be used 
over a time period that gives an objective measure of a firm’s actual performance.  The 
present research will utilize Jensen’s alpha to determine the average difference between 
the monthly return of the acquiring firm’s stock and the S&P 500 to calculate a firm’s 
post-acquisition performance, or abnormal return.   
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Independent Variable: Diversification 
 The present research seeks to distinguish between diversifying and non-
diversifying M&A activity to establish its effect on firm performance.  It follows many 
others that have categorized the amount of diversification that has taken place.  Rumelt 
(1974; 1982) categorized the amount of diversification into seven categories: single 
business, dominant vertical, dominant constrained, dominant linked-unrelated, related 
constrained, related linked, and unrelated business.  These categories were based a firm’s 
specialization ratio, related-core ratio, related ratio, and vertical ratio—all measures 
Rumelt devised himself.  The Herfindahl index computed from the sales of a firm by 
segment has also been used as the summation of the squared values of sales per segment 
as a fraction of total firm sales (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Comment & Jarrel 1993; Beattie 
1980).  However, most existing research uses some form of the Standardized Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1995; Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker 
1992; Hoskisson, et al., 1993; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).  SIC codes range from two 
to four digits, with greater industry specificity as the digits progress.  The present 
research follows past research as it distinguishes between diversifying and non-
diversifying M&A activity using SIC codes; also known as related and non-related, or 
conglomerate and non-conglomerate (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Agrawal, Jaffe, & 
Mandelker, 1992).  An acquisition will be considered non-diversifying if the two firms 
have the same four digit SIC codes.  If the firms’ codes are defined to any less than four 
digits (i.e., the firm operates in multiple four digit industries), or differ from each other, 
the acquisition will be considered diversifying.  Hoskisson et al. (1993) has demonstrated 
the construct validity of an objective categorical measure of diversification using SIC 
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codes; therefore, this research uses SIC codes to determine if an acquisition is 
diversifying or non-diversifying.     
Control Variables 
 Past research has shown that many other variables can affect firm post-acquisition 
performance.  It is believed that not only does the acquisition itself affect performance, 
but the conditions under which it took place and how it was conducted can have a 
significant impact.  Therefore, the impact of these additional variables is also taken into 
account.    
Acquiring Firm Environment.  The acquirer’s environment, measured by three 
measures (munificence, dynamism, and complexity) may have a significant impact on 
firm performance (e.g., Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Keats & Hitt, 
1988).  The measures attempt to describe three different aspects of a firm’s environment, 
and are included to account for the acquisition’s environmental properties.   
 Munificence is a measure used to describe the availability of resources in an 
environment correlated with the environment’s ability to sustain growth in a given 
industry (Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Keats & Hitt, 1988).  A more 
munificent environment is one with more available resources and has shown stable 
growth.  Accordingly, munificence is characteristically assumed to have a positive net 
effect on firm performance (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999). 
Dynamism is a measure of an industry’s environmental instability or volatility 
(Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Keats & Hitt, 1988).  A more dynamic 
environment exhibits more instability and therefore more risk.  It is believed that firms in 
dynamic environments will make an effort to diversify into less dynamic ones in order to 
 16
achieve greater stability, thereby leading to higher performance and less risk (Keats & 
Hitt, 1988).   
 Complexity is a measure of heterogeneity of the firm that is necessitated by the 
industry’s environment (Dess & Beard, 1984).  Sharfman and Dean (1991:683) describe 
it as “the level of complex knowledge that understanding the environment requires.”  In 
general, fragmented industries are considered more complex than concentrated ones 
(Keats & Hitt, 1988).  Fragmented industries have resources and power relatively widely 
distributed among numerous firms resulting in more competition.  Therefore, firms 
operating in less complex environments are expected to outperform those in more 
complex environments.   
Form of Acquisition.  Two forms of acquisition exist, mergers and tender offers; 
both have been extensively controlled for in past research (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, & 
Mandelker, 1992; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Loughran & Vijh, 1997).  Mergers occur 
when an acquisition is negotiated directly with a target’s managers without public 
disclosure—until a deal is announced.  Contrastingly, tender offers involve public bids 
made directly to the target’s shareholders who are then given a period of time to tender 
their shares to the acquirer for compensation, typically cash.  Tender offers must remain 
open to other bidders for some minimum period, allowing them to make bids and often 
creating competition for the target.   
Most research has concluded that the form of acquisition has an impact on firm 
performance.  Acquiring with tender offers has a positive effect on post-acquisition 
performance relative to acquiring with mergers (e.g., Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Loughran 
& Vijh, 1997).  In addition, Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) used game theory to develop 
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a model describing when the two forms should be used; they concluded that synergy 
gains for a tender offer should be higher than for a merger and should result in better 
post-acquisition performance.   
Method of Accounting.  Two forms of accounting for an acquisition existed during 
the time period of the sample, purchase and pooling.  When acquirers use purchase 
accounting, the acquired assets of the target are entered at the effective price paid 
(Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  On the other hand, pooling accounting is used when 
acquirers enter the assets of the target at their pre-acquisition book value and the 
difference paid for the firm is either debited or credited to the acquirer’s stockholders’ 
equity account (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  Past research had identified purchase 
accounting to be negatively correlated with post-acquisition performance as it may result 
in higher premiums paid for a target (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  It should be noted 
that as of July 2001, pooling accounting is no longer allowed by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), as purchase accounting is considered more 
accurate.   
Method of Payment.  The method of payment used in the acquisition can also 
impact firm performance.  Acquirers can pay for a target using cash, stock, or a 
combination of both.  Past research concludes that acquisitions paid with cash outperform 
those paid with stock (e.g., Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Loughran & Vijh, 1997).  Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) explain that managers who believe their firm is overvalued are more 
likely to pay with stock than cash, thus creating a predisposition for negative 
performance.  The method of payment and form of acquisition have been found to be 
significantly correlated (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  Tender offers generally involve 
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cash payment, while mergers are more likely to be paid for with stock (Rau & 
Vermaelen, 1998; Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992).  Due to the correlation between 
form of acquisition and method of payment, the present research only controls for the 
form of acquisition.   
Year of Acquisition.  The year an acquisition takes place may impact post-
acquisition performance.  It is commonly accepted that some years are better for the 
market than others.  Similar to Hayward and Hambrick (1997), the present research 
controls for the year the acquisition was completed.   
Firm Profitability.  A firm’s profitability prior to an acquisition may impact post-
acquisition performance.  A firm more profitable prior to an acquisition is more likely to 
experience continued high performance.  Past research has controlled for acquiring firm 
profitability (Campa & Kedia, 2002).  The present research controls for both acquirer and 
target profitability.  
Value of Transaction.  Target size may affect post-acquisition performance.  For 
example, it may be easier to integrate smaller firms (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Clark & 
Ofek, 1994).  Therefore, the present research controls for target size with the value of the 
transaction.  The larger the transaction, the larger the target.   
Acquisition Experience.  Acquisition experience may impact post acquisition 
performance.  However, past research has observed conflicting results.  Fowler and 
Schmidt (1989) found that an acquirer’s acquisition experience had a significant and 
positive impact on that firm’s post-acquisition experience.  On the other hand, Hayward 
(2002) found the opposite in an extensive study looking at acquisition experience; he 
determined that greater acquisition experience resulted in significant and negative firm 
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post-acquisition performance.  The present research controls for acquisition experience of 
the acquirer as it may have an impact on post-acquisition returns. 
Summary 
 M&A activity has been extensively studied, yet the impact of diversification on 
acquiring firm performance remains unclear.  Conflicting findings of past research may 
be the result of the wide cross-sections of M&A activity that assumed all acquisitions are 
the same.  However, acquisitions are not all the same (Bower, 2001); therefore, it is not 
surprising that prior cross-sectional research that assumes homogeneity of M&A samples 
exhibits inconsistent results.  Building on past research, the present research attempts to 
add to the body of knowledge by studying how diversification affects post-acquisition 
performance after high technology targets are acquired.  High-technology acquisitions 
have been identified as different from other acquisitions in general (Bower, 2001; 
Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999).  By limiting the sample to high-technology acquisitions, the 
present research attempts to isolate the impact of diversification on post-acquisition 
performance, while controlling for the effects of variables found significant in prior 
research. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
This chapter begins by describing the sample used for the present research.  It 
then details the variables and analysis used to create a multiple regression model to 
determine diversification’s impact on firm post-acquisition performance.   
Sample 
For the present research, an initial sample of 380 high-technology target 
acquisitions was identified from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) mergers and 
acquisitions database that occurred from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1998.  This 
timeframe was selected because it is relatively recent and controls for the known impacts 
of the business cycle on acquisition activity by ensuring all performance measurement 
occurred in a period of favorable market conditions (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; 
Lubatkin et. al., 1997).  The following industries were considered high-technology 
industries by the present research: chemicals (SIC 28), computer equipment (SIC 35), 
electronics (SIC 36), aerospace (SIC 37), instruments (SIC 38), communications (SIC 
48), and software and services (SIC 73).  Limiting the merger and acquisition (M&A) 
sample to only one industry (high-technology) is justified to help eliminate cross-
sectional analysis problems that may have contributed to conflicting results in past M&A 
research.  In addition, the sample was limited to targets with a market capitalization of at 
least $10M to ensure the target firms would have a significant impact on the acquirer 
(e.g., Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; Finkelstein, 1997).   
 Two further limitations were placed on the initial sample.  First, acquisitions were 
eliminated from the sample if data for defining the research variables was not located in 
 21
the SDC database or COMPUSTAT (a database of financial, statistical, and marketing 
information).  Second, the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) located at the 
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business maintains a comprehensive 
collection of standard and derived security data for the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq Stock 
Market.  This database had to contain additional data on the firms in order to calculate 
several of the research variables.  After deleting acquisitions with missing data, the final 
sample contained 325 data points.  
Dependent Variable: Jensen’s Alpha 
 To measure the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer, Jensen’s alpha 
(Jensen, 1968) will be used.  Prior research has examined post-acquisition performance 
over a three-year period (e.g. Ramaswamy, 1997).  A three-year examination period 
allows for the full effect of the acquisition to be observed on firm performance (Lubatkin 
et.al., 2001).  For each month following the acquisition (t = 1 to 36), the following 
regression model was calculated: 
Rit = α + β(Rmt) + εit 
 
where: 
Rit  is the monthly rate of return of firm i during month t 
α   is Jensen’s alpha 
β   is a firm’s stock price variance relative to the market’s variance 
Rmt   is the monthly rate of return of the market benchmark during month t 
εit  is the random error term 
  
The regression intercept, Jensen’s alpha, measures the average difference between 
the market benchmark’s return and the return of the firm, or abnormal return (Alexander 
& Francis, 1986).  The S&P500 index served as the market benchmark.  Individual firm 
stock and market benchmark monthly rates of return are based on data from the CRSP 
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database.  A positive Jensen’s alpha value indicates the firm performed better relative to 
the market, with the converse true as well.  Intuitively, a value of zero indicates the firm’s 
stock performance relative to the market was not different.  
Independent Variable: Diversification 
 The present research uses diversification as the independent variable to determine 
its effect on post-acquisition performance.  Target and acquirers’ Standardized Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes were obtained from the COMPUSTAT database to the 4-digit 
level.  If the acquirer and target had the same 4-digit SIC codes, the acquisition was 
considered a non-diversifying one.  If the acquirer and targets’ SIC codes were different 
at any level, the acquisition was considered to be diversifying.  Non-diversifying 
acquisitions were coded with a 1, while diversifying ones were coded with a 0.   
Control Variables 
 Additional variables have been shown to impact post-acquisition performance 
(e.g., Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Campa & Kedia, 2002; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Loughran & Vijh, 1997) and will be 
controlled for in the present research.  First, the value of the transaction in millions of 
dollars as reported in the SDC database was used to control for the size of the target.  
Second, both acquirer and target firm past profitability, or return on sales (ROS) 
measured in the prior year was controlled for.  ROS was calculated by dividing net 
income by sales.  Third, the form of acquisition (tender offer or merger) was controlled 
for with a dichotomous dummy variable.  Mergers were coded with a 0, while tender 
offers were coded with a 1; data was obtained from the SDC database.  Fourth, another 
dichotomous dummy variable was used to control for the method of accounting (pooling 
 23
or purchase).  Acquisitions that used pooling accounting were coded with a 0, while those 
that used purchase accounting were coded with a 1; again, data was obtained from the 
SDC database.  Fifth, three measures of the industry environment (i.e., munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity) were used to control for the firms’ environment.  These 
measures were obtained following procedures used by Keats and Hitt (1988) (see 
Appendix B).  Sixth, acquisition experience was controlled for by including a continuous 
variable equal to the sum of the acquirers’ past acquisitions over the previous three years.  
Finally, the year of the acquisition, or time period, was controlled for using a 
polychotomous dummy variable with the year 1994 as the base.  The year of the 
acquisition was obtained from the SDC database.   
Analysis 
 A multiple regression model was created with Jensen’s alpha as the dependent 
variable, diversification as the independent variable, and the control variables.  During 
the analysis it was determined that two outliers existed using a plot of the studentized 
residuals.  These outliers were greater than four standard deviations from zero and were 
removed.  In addition, the three assumptions of regression: normality of the residuals, 
independence of the sample, and constant variance were validated using the Shapiro-Wilk 
goodness of fit test, the Durbin-Watson test, and the Breusch-Pagan test respectively.  A 
further discussion of the validation of the three regression assumptions is included in 
Appendix A.   
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IV.  Results and Discussion 
 
 This chapter presents the results of the multiple regression analysis of the high-
technology target sample of 323 acquisitions (two outliers were removed during the 
analysis).  The model created produced statistically significant findings.  In addition, this 
chapter will include a discussion of the results obtained.   
Results 
 Table 1 contains the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all of the 
variables included in the model.  Acquirer prior profitability was positive with a value of 
0.816, meaning the acquiring firms, on average, made a slight profit.  Target profitability 
was -48.295; however, this value exhibited a large standard deviation (615.714), making 
interpretation difficult.  The average value of the transactions included in the sample was 
$865.872 million.  This was higher than the cutoff of $10 million ensuring the target 
acquisitions were significant to the acquirers.  Only 18.2% of acquisitions were 
performed with tender offers, the majority being mergers.  Purchase accounting was used 
in 56.6% acquisitions as opposed to pooling accounting.  With averages of 1.183, 1.034, 
and 0.854, the acquirers’ environmental measures, in general, relate that the 
environments were increasing in munificence, becoming more dynamic, and decreasing 
in complexity, respectively (Note: higher complexity values denote lower environmental 
complexity).  On average, the acquirers had performed 3.615 prior acquisitions in the 
previous three years.  Between 1994 and 1998, the proportions of acquisitions performed 
were 8.3%, 17.8%, 17.2%, 23.7%, and 32.6% respectively.  Finally, 38.5% of the 
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acquisitions in the sample were considered non-diversifying, meaning the majority were 
diversification-oriented acquisitions.  
 Some of the correlations in the table are notable.  Those variables correlated with 
Jensen’s alpha and diversification are most interesting.  Acquirer prior profitability, 1995, 
1996, and 1998 are all significantly (p < 0.01) correlated with Jensen’s alpha.  In 
addition, the form of acquisition, method of accounting, and acquirer munificence are all 
significantly (p < 0.01) correlated with diversification.  As expected the variables for the 
years were also highly correlated with each other.  Finally, Jensen’s alpha and 
diversification themselves were significantly (p < 0.05) correlated.  Although only 
notable, these correlations add insight into how the variables in the model interact and 
relate with each other.   
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Mean Std Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Jensen's Alpha 0.004 0.024 1
2 Acquirer Profitability 0.816 5.277 0.198** 1
3 Target Profitability -48.295 615.714 -0.024 -0.079 1
4 Value of Transactionb 865.872 3043.667 -0.058 -0.019 0.018 1
5 Form of Acquisition 0.182 0.386 -0.037 -0.007 0.030 -0.032 1
6 Method of Accounting 0.566 0.496 0.126* 0.079 -0.043 -0.089 0.379** 1
7 Acquirer Munificence 1.183 0.132 0.099 0.009 0.067 -0.089 -0.139* -0.198** 1
8 Acquirer Dynamism 1.034 0.040 -0.015 0.046 0.028 -0.037 0.053 0.070 0.089 1
9 Acquirer Complexity 0.854 0.256 0.119* 0.104 0.040 -0.043 -0.011 -0.057 0.016 -0.156** 1
10 Acquirer Acquisition Experience 3.615 4.792 0.043 -0.044 -0.006 -0.023 0.006 0.007 0.070 -0.077 0.124* 1
11 1995c 0.178 0.383 -0.142** -0.115* 0.008 -0.065 0.009 0.032 -0.180** 0.064 -0.145** -0.147** 1
12 1996c 0.172 0.378 -0.165** -0.063 0.032 0.040 -0.044 0.011 0.066 0.028 0.127* -0.016 -0.212** 1
13 1997c 0.237 0.426 -0.043 -0.080 0.026 -0.036 0.002 -0.063 0.086 0.022 0.005 0.027 -0.260** -0.251** 1
14 1998c 0.326 0.470 0.322** 0.243** -0.063 0.085 0.011 0.035 0.009 -0.079 0.051 0.115* -0.327** -0.317** -0.388** 1
15 Diversification 0.385 0.487 0.141* 0.020 0.054 0.116* -0.159** -0.188** 0.218** -0.050 -0.100 -0.137* -0.038 -0.087 0.057 0.045
a n = 323 acquisitions
b $M
c Dummy variable with 1994 as base year; mean represents the proportion of acquisions completed that year
* p  < 0.05
** p  < 0.01
Variable
Table 1:  Variable Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
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 Multiple regression analysis identified both the control variables that had 
significant impact on Jensen’s alpha, or post-acquisition firm performance, and the 
independent variable’s (diversification) effect.  The model obtained an adjusted R-
squared value of 0.156, with an F-ratio of 5.252 (p < 0.0001); therefore, the model could 
explain almost 16% of the variance within the data, and had at least one variable with a 
statistically significant impact.  Table 2 contains the multiple regression results.   
Variable Standardized Regression Coefficient
Acquirer Profitability 0.091#
Target Profitability -0.005
Value of Transaction -0.062
Form of Acquisition -0.078
Method of Accounting 0.180**
Acquirer Munificence 0.076
Acquirer Dynamism 0.013
Acquirer Complexity 0.119*
Acquirer Acquisition Experience 0.008
-0.029
-0.085
0.027
0.248**
Diversification 0.138**
R2 0.193
Adjusted R2 0.156
F 5.25
a n = 323
# p < 0.10
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
1997
1998
Table 2:  Standardized Multiple Regression Results
1995
1996
 
Four control variables had significant impacts on the independent variable, in 
addition to two others that were correlated but not highly significant.  To begin with, the 
profitability of the acquirer in the year prior to the acquisition had a positive and 
significant impact on Jensen’s Alpha (p = 0.078).  The form of acquisition variable 
showed that acquisitions performed with mergers were positively correlated with post-
acquisition performance; however, this was not highly significant (p = 0.149).  In 
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addition, purchase accounting was shown to have a positive and strong significant impact 
on Jensen’s Alpha (p = 0.001).  Two of the three acquirer industry environment variables 
were positively associated with post-acquisition performance.  Munificence with a p-
value of 0.158 was not highly significant; however, low complexity was with a p-value of 
0.022.  The dummy variable for year 1998 was the last of the control variables to have a 
significant impact.  It was positive with a p-value of 0.006.  No other variables had an 
impact on Jensen’s Alpha.  The significance of these control variables illustrates the 
importance of controlling for their impact on the performance of the acquirers after the 
acquisitions.   
Integral to the present research, the independent variable had a highly significant 
impact on firm post-acquisition performance.  The act of not diversifying during an 
acquisition was positively correlated with Jensen’s Alpha (p < 0.01).  The diversification 
variable’s ability to help explain variance in the model establishes its impact on the 
performance of the acquirers after they have completed an acquisition.   
 The regression model proved to be valid.  Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores 
indicated multicollinearity within the independent and control variables did not exist and 
was not a problem.  In addition, the necessary assumptions of regression (i.e., 
independence of the sample, normality of the residuals, and constant variance) were 
satisfied by the model.  The multiple regression output and a further discussion of the 
assumptions are included in Appendix A.      
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Discussion 
 Several variables in the model had an impact on post-acquisition performance 
measure.  Diversification and four control variables were significant.  A discussion 
follows.  
As expected, acquirer profitability in the year prior to the acquisition played a role 
in determining if the acquisition would become a success or failure.  Acquirers that were 
more profitable prior to an acquisition were more likely to experience positive post-
acquisition performance.  Managers of profitable firms, most likely, have a better 
understanding of how to operate firms more efficiently than managers of less profitable 
ones.  It is reasonable to assume that this wisdom translates itself to the new company 
formed by the acquisition, allowing for continued higher profitability.  In addition, a firm 
operating with less profitability is more likely to carry on the problems making it less 
profitable to the newly created company.  Companies operating less profitably most 
likely have a larger amount of debt than more profitable ones.  These less profitable 
companies often increase their debt when purchasing a target, often creating firms that 
cannot perform well due to their high debt burden.  The present research has shown that 
acquirer prior profitability can impact the post-acquisition performance of the created 
firm in similar manner to which it was prior to the acquisition, either positive or negative.   
 The method of accounting used for the acquisition was shown to have a strong 
impact on the post-acquisition performance of the new firm.  Acquirers that used 
purchase accounting performed better after the acquisition than those that used pooling 
accounting instead.  Pooling accounting has been shown to be significantly correlated 
with higher target premiums (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987).  Further, higher target 
premiums have been determined to negatively impact post-acquisition performance 
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(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).   The lower performance of acquisitions that used pooling 
accounting can most likely be attributed to the negative effects created when high 
premiums are paid for targets.  It is suggested these negative effects result as the new 
firm struggles to recoup the high price it paid for the target and from lack of attention as 
the firm manager focuses on the new business while possibly neglecting the core one 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).  Acquisitions that use purchase accounting are less likely 
to have high premiums.  This lack of high target premiums most likely yields better post-
acquisition performance.  An important note to add is that as of July 2001, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board no longer allows pooling accounting to be used.  A possible 
implication of this decision is the absolute use of purchase accounting may lead to more 
in-depth scrutiny of M&A activity.   
 The present research also identified the industry environmental measure 
complexity had a significant impact on post-acquisition performance.  As expected, 
acquisitions in less complex, or more concentrated, environments were shown to 
outperform those that were not.  Sharfman and Dean (1991) found that managers in more 
complex environments devote more resources in order to make their companies more 
flexible and to increase their “information-processing capability.”  In addition, Keats and 
Hitt (1988) suggest that low complexity supports growth, as the lack of complexity in the 
environment allows for more resources to be devoted towards growth.  More complex 
environments require firms to devote more resources in order to deal with the difficult 
business environment.  Therefore, it can be reasoned that the better performance of 
acquisitions in less complex environments may be due to the larger amount of resources 
solely devoted towards optimizing the newly created firm performance. 
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 The dummy control variable for year 1998 was the final control variable to have a 
significant impact on the post-acquisition firm performance.  Acquisitions performed 
during 1998 were more likely to experience positive post-acquisition performance than 
acquisitions performed in the previous four years.  This can be attributed to the high-
technology market boom that began in 1998 and continued throughout the late nineties.  
In general, high-technology firms had abnormally positive performance during the boom.  
The high performance of these firms during this time was reflected in the significance of 
the 1998 dummy variable.   
 Most important to the present research, the independent variable, diversification, 
was shown to have a significant and negative effect on firm post-acquisition 
performance.  Firms that acquired targets in other areas of business or industries 
performed worse than those that acquired similar targets.  This finding concurs with other 
research, thereby confirming that a “diversification discount” exists (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, 
& Mandelker, 1992; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Anand & Singh 1997; Mason & Goudzwaard 
1976; Lang & Stulz 1994).  When firms used acquisitions to diversify into high-
technology industries, value was lost.   
The fact that diversification destroys value is not easily understood, and that is 
possibly why managers persist with diversification in the face of negative research.  If 
managers were aware of what factors destroy firm value in acquisitions, they would 
surely take steps to avoid them.  This CEO hubris (overconfidence) and the high 
premiums paid for targets have been cited as possible reasons why diversification fails to 
create value.  Hayward and Hambrick (1997) found that CEO hubris and high premiums 
were correlated with negative post-acquisition performance.  They theorized that CEO 
 32
overconfidence leads to higher premiums paid for targets, which creates poor conditions 
for acquisitions to succeed since the new overvalued corporation must deal with a high 
debt load.  
Another explanation for the poor performance of diversifying acquisitions that 
may be relevant is the difficulty in effectively assimilating the target.  Diversification 
attempts to bring together companies with fewer similarities.  Integrating two companies 
with different cultures and strategies for management, production, advertising, markets, 
etc., may make assimilation more difficult in diversifying acquisitions.  In contrast, 
related or non-diversifying acquisitions experience significantly higher post-acquisition 
performance partly because assimilation faces fewer challenges for related firms.  
Summary 
 The present research identified a “diversification discount” for high-technology 
firms acquired between 1994 and 1998.   This finding concurs with others that identified 
a diversification discount when large cross-sections, containing corporations in many 
different sectors, of acquisitions were examined.  In addition, the present research also 
identified that four control variables (acquirer prior profitability, the method of 
accounting, environmental complexity, 1998) impact post-acquisition performance.   
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V.  Conclusion 
 This chapter summarizes the methodology and results of the present research and 
thoughts for future analysis.  In addition, possible Department of Defense (DoD) 
implications are presented. 
Research Summary 
 The present research adds to the merger and acquisition (M&A) body of 
knowledge by examining 323 (two were removed as outliers) high-technology target 
acquisitions between 1994 and 1998 in order to determine diversification’s effect on post-
acquisition performance.  By focusing only on high-technology targets, past problems 
associated with examining large cross-sections of firms were overcome.  In addition, to 
ensure the full effect of the acquisition was observed, the present research observed the 
post-acquisition performance for three years.  Jensen’s Alpha (Jensen, 1968) was used as 
the dependent variable to measure firm performance (abnormal return) relative the 
S&P500.  Further, thirteen control variables were included in the analysis as they may 
also have an impact on the success or failure of an acquisition.   
 Diversification was observed to have a significant and negative impact on firm 
post-acquisition performance value, resulting in a “diversification discount” that concurs 
with past research (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Berger & Ofek, 1995; 
Anand & Singh 1997; Mason & Goudzwaard 1976; Lang & Stulz 1994).  In addition, 
four control variables were significantly correlated with post-acquisition performance.  
Acquirer prior profitability, the use of purchase accounting as the method of payment, 
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and the year 1998 all had a positive impact, while environmental complexity had a 
negative one. 
Future Research 
 Merger and acquisition activity has been extensively analyzed, yet much room 
still remains for further understanding.  Acquisitions continue despite the large body of 
research suggesting they destroy firm value.  The present research attempted to overcome 
one of the largest possible problems associated with past research in general, the large 
cross-sectional analysis.  By not consistently distinguishing between diversifying and 
non-diversifying acquisitions, past research that identifies acquisitions underperform may 
be skewed by the lower performance of diversifying acquisitions that represent the 
majority of M&A activity in the present sample.  If this notion is true, this suggests that 
past research findings may be better described as having documented the poor 
performance of diversifying firms.   
 The present research is exploratory in nature and additional research is warranted, 
as indicated by the low R-squared value.  First, research could examine additional 
business segments, types of acquisition, and time frames.  Second, research focusing on 
theoretical development and empirical testing of factors that would allow managers to 
make better decisions in selecting and integrating acquisition targets is needed.  In 
addition to managers, the further understanding gained may allow stockholders to make 
better judgments of the future value of a company they have an interest in that is 
considering an acquisition.   
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Implications for the DoD 
 Beginning in the mid nineties, defense firms embarked on a massive consolidation 
effort.  It was explained that they needed to do so by then Secretary of Defense William 
Perry if they wished to survive the large defense spending reduction.  In a recent article, 
Moran (2003) states, “What were thirty-three separate businesses in 1990 are five defense 
firms today.”  This consolidation was encouraged at the time, but may have resulted in a 
defense industrial base that fosters little competition for DoD contracts.  Many point to 
the resulting small defense industrial base and express that few, if any positive benefits, 
resulted from this consolidation as fewer contractors now receive much more of the 
defense budget (Moran, 2003).  However the present research suggests that the non-
diversifying, or consolidation, M&A activity taken by the defense firms was probably the 
best option for them.  The present research could argue that if these firms had diversified 
into the other industries they might be in worse financial shape than they presently are.   
 A recent Pentagon report (DoD, 2003) recommends that the Department of 
Defense categorize and analyze the firms within the defense industrial base in relation to 
five operational effects-based sectors: combat support, power projection, precision 
engagement, homeland and base protection, and integrated battlespace.  This may serve 
as a catalyst to motivate current defense firms to focus on the effects-based sectors from 
which their capabilities will be evaluated in the future.  The report describes that one way 
legacy defense firms may develop these new, or transformational, capabilities is by 
acquiring emerging defense suppliers.  The results of the present research, and much of 
the past M&A research, suggests firm performance may improve as the defense firms 
focus their businesses through M&A activity.  However, King and Driessnack 
(Forthcoming) stress that because much of the impact of M&A activity is still poorly 
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understood, it would not be prudent for the government to have a pro-active policy 
towards M&A activity.   
Summary 
 The present research accomplished its original objectives.  It first identified and 
documented past research that was pertinent to this study.  This documentation provided 
a baseline of past M&A research used to develop the current model of acquisition 
performance.  The present research then added to the body of M&A understanding by 
taking a direct look at the high-technology segment of M&A activity and identifying 
diversification’s impact on it.  Diversification was found to have a significant negative 
impact on firm post-acquisition performance, while controlling for the type of 
acquisition.   
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 Appendix A:  Regression Output and Assumptions 
Regression Output 
 
All outputs were obtained using Jump 5.0.  The regression results include both R-
squared and adjusted R-squared values, an ANOVA table, variable (parameter) estimates, 
variable p-values, and VIF scores.  Figure 1 contains the regression output. 
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Figure 1:  Regression Output 
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Regression Assumptions 
 Independence of the dataset was objectively verified using the Durbin-Watson 
(DW) test.  The model obtained a DW p-value of 0.574, much greater than the alpha 
value of 0.05, indicating that the dataset was independent at a 95% confidence level.  
Figure 2 is the Durbin-Watson test output. 
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    323
Num ber of Obs.
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AutoCorrelation
  0.5744
Prob<DW
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Figure 2:  Durbin-Watson Test Output 
The assumption requiring a normal distribution of the residuals was tested two 
ways.  A plot of the studentized residuals clearly illustrates that the distribution of the 
residuals is normal indicated by the ‘bell shaped’ curve.  In addition, objectively, the 
Shapiro-Wilk (SW) goodness of test fit obtained a p-value of 0.336.  The (SW) p-value 
greater than 0.05 (p = 0.336) indicates that at a confidence level of 95% a normal 
distribution fits the distribution of the residuals.  Figure 3 includes this data. 
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Figure 3:  Studentized Residual Distribution & Shapiro-Wilk Test Output 
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 Constant variance of the model was also examined two ways.  First a plot of the 
residuals versus predicted values of Jensen’s alpha was created.  This plot is Figure 4.  
From this plot it is clear that no pattern exists, leading one to believe that the assumption 
of constant variance is valid.  In addition, the Breusch-Pagan test was employed to 
objectively test the assumption (Neter, 1996).  The test yielded a p-value of 0.990, again 
confirming that at a 95% confidence level the assumption of constant variance.  Figure 5 
contains the output used for the Breusch-Pagan test. 
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Figure 4:  Residual vs. Predicted Plot 
 
Table 3:  Breusch-Pagan Test Table 
Constant Variance Analysis (Breusch-Pagan Test)
SSE of model 0.13629147
SSR of residual^2 model 0.00001252
# of columns 15
n 323
df 14
BP value 4.68792617
p -value 0.98969935
Full Model without outliers
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Appendix B:  Calculations for Environmental Measures 
The main advocate of this research provided all three environmental measures.  
However, a brief discussion of how they can be obtained is included.  These calculations 
are taken from and described further in Keats & Hitt (1988). 
Munificence 
 The value used to describe the munificence was derived from two equations that 
accounted for high-technology industry sales and high-technology industry profit for the 
five years prior to the acquisition.  High-technology industry sales and profit data were 
obtained from the COMPUSTAT database.  Using simple regression, the slope 
coefficients of these lines were combined and then divided by two.  The equations are 
below: 
Yt = β0 + β1t + εt 
where: 
Yt  is high-technology industry sales for year t 
β0    is the regression intercept 
β1 is the regression slope coefficient 
t is the year t 
εt  is the random error term 
   
Xt = B0 + B1t + et 
where: 
Xt  is high-technology industry profit for year t 
B0    is the regression intercept 
B1 is the regression slope coefficient 
t is the year t 
et  is the random error term 
 
M = [β1 + B1] / 2 
where: 
M  is the measure of high-technology munificence observed for the prior five 
years 
β1     is the industry sales regression slope coefficient 
B1 is the industry profit regression slope coefficient 
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Dynamism 
 Dynamism was computed using the standard errors of each regression slope 
coefficient from the sales and profit equations above.  The two values were combined and 
then divided by two.  The standard error equation of a simple regression model is below 
as well as the dynamism equation. 
s = √ [SSE / (n – 2)] 
 where: 
 SSE is the sum of squared error for the regression model 
 n is the number of data points in the model, i.e., degrees of freedom 
 
 
D = [sy + sx] / 2 
where: 
D  is the measure of high-technology dynamism observed for the prior five 
years 
Sy      is the industry sales regression standard error 
Sx is the industry profit regression standard error 
Complexity 
Complexity is a measure of heterogeneity of the firm that is necessitated by the 
industry’s environment (Dess & Beard, 1984).  The calculations to obtain the complexity 
measure are much more complex than the munificence and dynamism ones, and will not 
be described.  For a full discussion regarding the mechanics, see Keats & Hitt (1988).   
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